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NOTES AND COMMENTS
In the Rochlin case the vendor has conferred no benefits upon the
vendee, and in no event could he be made subject to a decree of specific
performance. Were the house to increase in value, the vendor could
return the deposit and sell to a higher bidder, and the vendee could
neither enforce the contract specifically nor recover damages. To allow
a retention of the deposit in this situation would, in effect, be awarding
damages for breach of an agreement declared void by the statute,17 and
would be treating the contract as if the statute read "no action shall be
brought .... " In view of the court's non-recognition of the part per-
formance doctrine and the fact that the North Carolina statute of frauds
provides that such a contract as that in the principal case is void, it
would seem that application of the minority rule, to allow the vendee to
recover the payment made without the necessity of proving the disputed
terms of the contract, would better serve the purpose of the statute and
would be more consistent with the effect of its prior application.' 8
S. DEAN HAMRICIC.
Criminal Law-Convicts--Commencement of Sentence*
In North Carolina, a prisoner sentenced to the state prison system
does not begin to serve his sentence until he is actually received from the
county jail.' In a majority of the states where the issue has been decided
in the absence of a controlling statute, a sentence is -deemed to begin on
the date when it is pronounced. 2 When the defendant is not in custody
v. Douglas, 156 Ky. 462, 161 S. W. 225 (1913) (although prior Kentucky cases
followed the majority rule) ; Scott v. Bush, 26 Mich. 418 (1873) ; Brown v. Pol-
lard, 89 Va. 695, 17 S. E. 6 (1893).
'In Albea v. Griffin, 22 N. C. 9, 10 (1838), the court stated: "We admit this
objection [the statute of frauds] to be well founded, and we hold as a consequence
from it that the contract being void, not only its specific performance cannot be
enforced, but that no action will lie in law or equity, for damages because of non-
performance."
8 Of course, the vendor should be allowed to off-set any benefits he has con-
ferred upon the vendee, such as reasonable rental value if vendee has been in pos-
session of the property.
* This material was prepared during the summer of 1951 while the author was
serving as a member of the staff of the Institute of. Government. It is part of a
forthcoming guidebook for prison officials to be published by the Institute.
'This is not a statutory rule, nor are there any case decisions or rulings of the
attorney-general to support it. According to the attorneys for the prison depart-
ment, this has been the administrative policy since the state took over the county
road camp system in 1933.2 Alexander v. Posey, 32 Ala. App. 494, 27 So. 2d 237 (1946) ; State v. Nichols,
167 Kan. 565, 207 P. 2d 469 (1949) ; Harding v. State Bd. of Parole, 307 Mass.
217, 29 N. E. 2d 756 (1940) ; Braxton v. State, 103 Miss. 127, 60 So. 66 (1912) ;
Commonwealth ex tel. Lerner v. Smith, 151 Pa. Super. 265, 30 A. 2d 347 (1943)
(stating general rule, although controlled by statute adopting the minority view) ;
State ex rel. Plumb v. Superior Court, 24 Wash. 2d 510, 166 P. 2d 188 (1946) ; 15
Am. Jura. 110 (1951). Contra: Gorovitz v. Sartain, 1 F. 2d 602 (N. D. Ga. 1924)
(The court upheld an Atlanta Penitentiary regulation directing that time com-
menced when a prisoner was received, citing a Georgia statute directing that good
conduct allowances began when a prisoner was received.) ; Clifford v. Maryland,
30 Md. 575 (1869) ; Ex parte Holden, 31 Okla. Cr. 133, 237 P. 622 (1925).
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at the time sentence is imposed, however, the sentence does not com-
mence until he is committed.3 The minority view, adhered to by North
Carolina, has been adopted in two states by statute,4 while two other
states have enacted the majority view.5 In the federal courts, a sentence
is effective when the defendant is received at the prison, but if he is
committed to a jail or other place of detention to await transportation
to prison, the sentence commences when he is received at the jail or
other place of detention.6 If the judgment directs that the sentence be
served in a particular manner, as on a chain gang, then the sentence will
not begin until the prisoner arrives to carry out the provisions of the
judgment." If it is decided on appeal that the sentence imposed is er-
roneous and that the defendant must be resentenced, or if the judgment
appealed from is affirmed, the bare weight of authority is in favor of
allowing credit for time served under the prior sentence.8
Because of present judicial and penal administrative practices (and
occasionally by mistake9 ), a prisoner may spend a substantial amount of
time in jail before he gets to a state prison to begin service of his sentence.
Some counties have only two or three criminal court terms a year,10
and if a defendant is unable to post bail following his arrest; he must
remain in jail until his case is called for trial. Furthermore, the prison
department does not have to accept a prisoner from a court inferior to
'In re Breton, 93 Me. 39, 44 A. 125 (1899); Volker v. McDonald, 120 Neb.
508, 233 N. W. 890 (1931).
'Ex parte Gough, 124 Cal. App. 493, 12 P. 2d 968 (1932) ; Keyes v. Chrisman,
118 Ore. 626, 247 P. 807 (1926).
In re Fuller, 34 Neb. 581, 52 N. W. 577 (1892) ; Commonwealth c.x rel. Acco-
bacco v. Burke, 162 Pa. Super. 592, 60 A. 2d 426 (1948).
318 U. S. C. §3568 (1948) ; Moss v. U. S., 72 F. 2d 30 (4th Cir. 1934).
" Dixon v. Beaty, 188 Ga. 689, 4 S. E. 2d 633 (1939).
"McDonald v. Moinet, 139 F. 2d 939 (6th Cir. 1944) ; Ex parte Phair, 2 Cal.
App. 2d 669, 38 P. 2d 826 (1934) ; D'Alessandro v. Tippins, 98 Fla. 853, 124 So.
455 (1929); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky. 760, 220 S. W. 1045 (1920);
Lindsey v. Superior Court, 33 Wash. 2d 94, 204 P. 2d 482 (1949). Contra: People
ex rel. Boyle v. Ragen, 400 Ill. 571, 81 N. E. 2d 444 (1947) (controlled by statute),
cert. denied, 335 U. S. 868 (1948) ; Davenport v. State, 143 Miss. 765, 109 So. 789
(1926) (controlled by statute); Clemons v. State, 92 Tenn. 282, 21 S. W. 525
(1893) ; Powell v. State, 124 Tex. Cr. 513, 63 S. W. 2d 712 (1933).
'John Lovett Ryals, Case no. 8328, March 30, 1951 term of City Court, Raleigh,
N. C., sentenced to six months on the roads for public drunkenness and indecent
exposure, remained in the Wake County jail from March 30, 1951 until May 8,
1951, because his appeal had not been docketed. He was transferred to the state
prison system on May 8, 1951. On July 12, 1951, superior court judge Chester R.
Morris denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but recommended that a
credit of thirty-nine days be allowed the prisoner for the oversight. His sentence
was commuted in accordance with the recommendation of the judge.
As a practical matter, the possibility that a prisoner will be detained at county
jails to maintain the property is foreclosed by N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-32 (1943):
"... and courts may also sentence prisoners to the county jail to be assigned to
work at the county home or other county-supported institution." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) This provision removes the temptation to "forget" to transfer prisoners
and work them at the jails by creating another source of labor supply. Therefore,
situations similar to the Ryals case are infrequent and inadvertent.
'ON. C. GEN. STAT. §7-70 (1951).
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the superior court while the judge retains control over the sentence, 11
so even after conviction and sentence the prisoner must wait until the
term of court expires.12 Prisoners who have appealed their convictions
do not have to be accepted by the department,' 3 so an additional delay
of ten days or more14 will be encountered unless an appeal is unlikely.
Finally, in some counties the department sends to the jail for prisoner's
only once a week. Although it has been shown that a delay of six months
or more is quite possible, the average waiting period would probably be
nearer two or three weeks. Such a delay might seem inconsequential
to a long term prisoner facing twenty or thirty years,15 but the state
system receives prisoners with as short terms as thirty days,'6 so it is
possible for a prisoner to spend as much time awaiting punishment as he
spends serving it.
The approved protection against delays before trial is a petition for
writ of mandamus. 17 The possibility of securing a writ of habeas corpus
seems to be practically foreclosed.' s Even if formal relief is denied,
though, the court has discretion to consider time spent in jail awaiting
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-30 (1943).
"In North Carolina, a court retains the power to alter a sentence during the
term of court at which the sentence is imposed. See, e.g., State v. Calcutt, 219 N. C.545, 15 S. E. 2d 9 (1941) ; State v. Warren, 92 N. C. 825 (1885). A federal court
never loses this power. FED. R. ClUm. P. 35, 45(c). If the prisoner has already
undergone a part of the sentence, however, the court can only reduce it, even
though the term of court has not expired. U. S. v. Murray, 275 U. S. 347 (1928)
State v. Crook, 115 N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513 (1894).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-30 (1943).
"N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-179 (1943) (justice of the peace courts-if the defendant
is present in court when the sentence is pronounced, he has ten days after judg-
ment to appeal; if he is absent, he has fifteen days following notice of the rendi-
tion of judgment) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-195 (1943) (municipal recorder's courts-
same procedure as the justice of the peace courts); N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-230(1943) (county recorder's courts-same procedure as justice of the peace courts) ;
N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-292 (1943) (general county courts-same procedure as the jus-
tice of the peace courts) ; N. C. GEN. STAT. §7-442 (1943) (special county courts-
same procedure as the justice of the peace courts); N. C. GEN. STAT. §15-180(1943) (superior courts-same procedure as in superior court civil cases) ; N. C.GEN. STAT. §1-279 (1943) (superior court civil cases-ten days for appeal after
rendition of sentence, if during term; if out of term, ten days after notice of rendi-
tion) ; Houston v. Lumber Co., 136 N. C. 328, 48 S. E. 738 (1904) (Appeal may be
taken ten days after adjournment. The reason presumably is that the sentence to
be appealed from is not fixed during the term.)
"' Felons sentenced to Central Prison at Raleigh are protected to a certain extent
by a statute which directs their transfer to Central Prison within five days after the
end of the term of court during which they are sentenced. N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-
29 (1943).
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §148-30 (1943) : "No male person shall be so assigned [to
the state prison system] whose term of imprisonment is less than thirty day."
" Frankel v. Woodrough, 7 F. 2d 796 (8th Cir. 1925) ; Chrisman v. Superior
Court, 63 Cal. App. 477, 219 P. 85 (1923) (petition for a writ of mandamus denied
on ground that good cause for delay existed) ; Hicks v. Judge of Recorder's Court,
236 Mich. 689, 211 N. W. 35 (1926).
" Fowler v. Hunter, 164 F. 2d 668 (10th Cir. 1947) ; Ruben v. Welch, 159 F.
2d 493 (4th Cir. 1947).
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trial when it imposes sentence,19 but this is not an absolute right of the
prisoner20 unless granted by statute.21
When a prisoner enters the state system, the prison department must
determine the length of time he is to serve, which in turn depends partly
on the date on which his sentence is deemed to have begun.2 2 The de-
partment has generally tended to grant credit for time spent in the county
jail if the detention was through no fault or acquiescence on the part of
the prisoner. The courts seem to make somewhat the same distinction.
Thus, it has been held that where a prisoner is too sick to be moved, or
if he has been exposed to a contagious disease, his detention until he
can be moved is reasonable.23 On the other hand, it has been held that
time which passed while a prisoner was out on escape did not count as
time served.24 Several North Carolina cases seem to deny such a dis-
tinction, for they contain flat statements to the effect that the date set for
the commencement of sentence is immaterial, and that if the time should
pass without the sentence being enforced, then the court may set a new
date and order the sentence to be carried into execution. 2 5 In each of
these cases, however, the prisoner was at liberty during the delay, and
the delay was brought about through a suspension of sentence granted
for the prisoner's benefit. The policy of the prison department to take
into account delays in service of sentence which arise through no fault
or acquiescence of the prisoner has prevented a flood of litigation, but it
was not designed to eliminate these delays and it has not done so.
A prisoner who is being detained in a county jail after trial has two
possible means of effecting his transfer to the state system so that his
sentence will commence. First, he may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, seeking his release from the county jail on the ground of un-
reasonable 'detention.26 Second, he may petition for a writ of mandamus,
" Byers v. U. S., 175 F. 2d 654 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. detied, 339 U. S. 976(1950) ; Ryan v. State, 100 Ala. 105, 14 So. 766 (1894) ; People v. Rose, 41 Cal.
App. 2d 445, 106 P. 2d 930 (1940) ; People ex rel. Lenefsky, on Behalf of Ash v.
Ashworth, 56 N. Y. S. 2d 5 (1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 809, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 283(1946) (discretion is in the parole authorities) ; Galyon v. State, 189 Tenn. 505,
226 S. W. 2d 270 (1950) (discretion is in the parole authorities) ; Ex parte Davis,
71 Tex. Cr. 538, 160 S. W. 459 (1913); Cohn v. Ketchum, 123 W. Va. 534, 17 S. E.
2d 43 (1941).
20 Byers v. U. S., 175 F. 2d 654 (10th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U. S. 976(1950) ; People ex rel. Lenefsky, on Behalf of Ash v. Ashworth, 56 N. Y. S. 2d
5 (1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 809, 60 N. Y. S. 2d 283 (1946).
2 People ex rel. Cohalan, on Behalf of Buckner v. Warden, 96 N. Y. S. 2d 749(1950) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Lerner v. Smith, 151 Pa. Super. 265, 30 A. 2d 347(1943) ; Lindsey v. Superior Court, 33 Wash. 2d 94, 204, P. 2d 482 (1949).
2 Other factors affecting this determination are good conduct allowances, com-
mutations, paroles, escapes, etc.
22 O'Neil v. State, 134 Ala. 189, 32 So. 667 (1902).
2, State v. Finch, 177 N. C. 599, 99 S. E. 409 (1919).
2 State v. McAfee, 198 N. C. 507, 152 S. E. 391 (1930) ; State v. Vickers, 184
N. C. 676, 114 S. E. 168 (1922) ; State v. Cockerham, 24 N. C. 204 (1842).28 Gorovitz v. Sartain, 1 F. 2d 602 (N. D. Ga. 1924) ; Ex parte Sichofsky, 273
F. 694 (S. D. Cal. 1921) (he may get credit on his sentence for the delay, if
"timely application" is made.) ; Thomas v. State, 151 So. 473 (Ala. 1933).
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asking the court to'direct the jailer to perform his ministerial duty as an
officer of the court and surrender the prisoner to the state authorities.
Combined with this request would have to be a prayer for an order
directing the state authorities to take him into custody.
Should the prisoner already be in a state prison when he realizes the
consequences of the delay in transfer, he may petition for a writ of habeas
corpus when the time spent in the state prison lus the period of deten-
tion in the county jail after trial equals the total sentence imposed, less
good conduct allowances, on the ground that he has completed service
of his sentence.27 And, although there is no authority for such a course,
no good reason appears why he could not petition the court for a writ
of mandamus directing his release.
Two steps could be taken immediately without legislative or judicial
action, which would effect a partial remedy to this problem of wasted
time. The prison department could arrange for more frequent trips to
jails from which it gets road camp prisoners, or it could arrange to be
called when prisoners are awaiting transfer.28 And, with careful preser-
vation of prisoners' rights, a system of prompt waiver of appeal rights
in proper cases would serve to eliminate time wasted while the prisoner
is waiting for the expiration of the appeal period. A general tightening
up of all of the procedures involved between arrest and commencement
of sentence would immediately effect a saving of time for state prisoners
too often delayed en route from arrest to punishment, and would pay
for itself in the resulting decrease in county penal expenditures.
HARPER JOHNSTON ELAM, III.
Dead Bodies-Recovery for Wrongful Interference with or Neglect
North Carolina is in accord' with most jurisdictions in holding that
there is a quasi-property right in the body of a dead person for purposes
of interment. The surviving spouse has the paramount right to the body;
if there is no surviving spouse, the right goes to the next of kin. An
interference with the right to possess the body and bury it is a breach of
duty which may make the wrongdoer liable for damages including mental
anguish. 2 Generally, only the person having the right of burial may
maintain action for wrongs to the body.3
" N. C. GEN. STAT. §17-3 (1943) ; Clark v. Surprenant, 94 F. 2d 969 (9th Cir.
1938) ; Alexander v. Posey, 32 Ala. App. 494, 27 So. 2d 237 (1946) ; Johnson v.
Lindsey, 89 Fla. 143, 103 So. 419 (1925) ; Whalen v. Cristell, 161 Kan. 747, 173
P. 2d 252 (1946) ; State ex rel. Murphy v. Wolfer, 127 Minn. 102, 148 N. W. 896(1914).
" The assumption is made, of course, that the saving to the prisoners wouldjustify the added expense.
1 Kyles v. Southern Ry., 147 N. C. 394, 61 S. E. 278 (1908).
'Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N. W. 238 (1891); Kyles v. Southern Ry.
supra note 1; Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N. W. 40 (1905) ; 25 C. J. S.,
Dead Bodies §§2-3, 8 (1941).
'Stephenson v. Duke University, 202 N. C. 624, 163 S. E. 598 (1932). See
Note 19 CORN. L. Q. 108, 111 (1933).
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